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Abstract In 2013 the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping agreed to undertake
what will, when implemented, become its most concrete project yet: the BRICS Development Bank (BDB).
From the perspective of the Chinese government, which already leads a vast and far-reaching cooperation
programme, the bank will not represent a significant addition to its cooperation portfolio. What, then, motivates
China’s participation in the initiative, and what can it bring to the table? This article analyses China’s interests
in the BDB in the light of its past experiences with development, at home and abroad. I argue that China’s
interests in backing the bank project are primarily political. In addition to offering a concrete opportunity to
legitimise China’s multilateralism strategy – burnishing China’s image as a responsible yet pro-reform global
player – the bank project also allows China to influence international development norms. At the same time,
the project also poses challenges for China, especially in terms of promoting poverty alleviation without
resorting to trickle-down assumptions about an infrastructure-focused approach to development.
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1 Introduction1
In 2013 the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa) grouping agreed to undertake
what will, when implemented, become its most
concrete project yet: a fully-fledged development
bank. The initiative – part of the coalition’s
efforts to press for reform of global governance
in international development – seeks to provide a
multilateral institution that can offer developing
countries access to capital for infrastructure and
industrialisation projects without resorting to
traditional institutions such as the World Bank.
The BRICS also argue that the new organisation
would better reflect the principles and practices
of contemporary South–South cooperation. In
addition to these joint objectives, in each of the
individual BRICS, policy elites have their own set
of motivations for backing the initiative.
Analysing these diverse interests is essential to
understanding the key political struggles and
alignments bound to emerge as the bank’s design
is negotiated and implemented.
For China, which already has a vast and far-
reaching cooperation programme, the BRICS
Development Bank (here shortened to BDB) will
not represent a significant addition to its
cooperation portfolio, including in Africa, where
China has been investing heavily for decades.
What factors, then, drive China’s participation in
the BDB? And what substantive ideas and
experiences does China bring to the initiative?
This article analyses Chinese policymakers’ key
motivations and potential contributions by
considering China’s experiences in trying to
foster development, both at home and abroad,
and its cooperation diplomacy.
My main argument is that China’s interests, in
backing the BDB project, are primarily political.
First, the bank project represents a concrete
opportunity to legitimise China’s multilateralism
strategy, burnishing the image that the Chinese
government has sought to convey of a responsible
global player bent on reshaping rather than
upending established institutions. Second, the
initiative offers China a chance to influence the
norms-setting process within the field of
development, contesting efforts by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) to codify and promote the
principles claimed by Northern donors. Finally, the
bank project represents an opportunity for China
to learn about the practices and principles adopted
by other providers of South–South cooperation.
Politically, in pursuing these interests, China has
to strike a careful balance. Precisely because
China’s economic weight and cooperation far
surpass those of its fellow BRICS states – its
GDP is larger than all of the other BRICS
combined – boosting the legitimacy of the
grouping as a multilateral platform requires
China to maintain a somewhat discreet position.
China’s interests are likely to influence the bank
through incremental negotiations rather than as
an aggressive strategy, which could come across
as off-putting to its fellow members and thus
undermine the grouping’s demands for a more
horizontal global governance architecture.
In addition, in shaping the bank’s orientation,
China must work to create innovative linkages
between two goals it has long championed:
infrastructure and poverty alleviation. Rather
than relying uncritically on trickle-down
economics assumptions that infrastructure
automatically begets broader economic and
social benefits, China – and more broadly, the
BRICS – must find innovative ways to mitigate
negative impacts and spread the benefits of
infrastructure more broadly. In other words,
China must apply the lessons it has learned
about the drawbacks of excessively focusing on
economic growth as a proxy for development.
The article is structured as follows. After
providing an overview of the BRICS and the
development bank project, the text offers an
analysis of China’s experience and interests in the
field of international development as they relate
to the BDB. The last part of the article examines
the implications of China’s involvement in the
project, as well as some of the initiative’s broader
repercussions for norms-setting within the field of
development cooperation.
2 The BRICS and the Development Bank project
2.1 The BRICS grouping
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a
proliferation of coalitions and informal
multilateral platforms – some, like the G20,
bringing together advanced and developing
countries, and others geared specifically at
South–South cooperation. Among the latter, the
BRICS grouping is arguably the most visible
initiative. The initially four-state coalition,
Abdenur China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and Multilateralism in South–South Cooperation86
2Gu&Carty IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:51  Page 86
bringing together Brazil, Russia, India and China
under the acronym BRIC, emerged in 2006 at
the initiative of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov, and the first summit was held in
Yekaterinburg, Russia on 16 June 2009. Since
then, the heads of state have been meeting
annually (with the 2011 entry of South Africa),
with subsequent summits held in Brasília (2010),
Sanya (2011), New Delhi (2012), and Durban
(2013). The 2014 meeting is scheduled to take
place in Fortaleza, Brazil.
The main impetus for the group’s formation was
a common interest in reforming (though not
necessarily overhauling) the global governance
architecture. At that juncture, the geographic
spread and relative dynamism of these
economies gave them unique leverage in pushing
for change at a time when the international
system was perceived to be in flux, with US
hegemony cast into doubt. Policy elites in the
BRICS have argued that, although certain
developing economies had become key drivers of
regional or global growth, the main organisations
involved in global governance remain dominated
by the few countries that set the rules after the
Second World War. Despite the BRICS’
economic, political, geographic and cultural
heterogeneity, their leaderships share the desire
to make the architecture more representative, at
least in the sense of opening up more space for
themselves. During the first two summits (2009
and 2010), the grouping focused heavily on the
global economic crisis, which presented
additional motivation for the coordination of
efforts and resources. Over time, the coalition
expanded its agenda, launching discussions in
fields as disparate as development cooperation,
technology, and political cooperation.
Despite the BRICS’ combined economic and
demographic relevance, the initiative has often
been met with scepticism, particularly from the
advanced economies, with some critics arguing
that the five states are too heterogeneous to
coordinate in any significant manner. This
pessimism is fuelled in part by the BRICS’ low
level of institutionalisation: the grouping has no
headquarters, no charter, no flag and no
governance structure beyond the cycle of
summits and meetings (Kahler 2013). Scepticism
is also perpetuated by a tendency (by media and
academics alike) to overemphasise the role of
Goldman Sachs’ economic projections in the
grouping’s formation – a point that tends to
underestimate the BRICS’ political dimension.
Conversely, other analysts have declared the
BRICS initiative as a fait accompli. According to
this view, the BRICS represent a concrete,
positive alternative to the current global system,
pressing for much-needed reform and
effectiveness while offering an alternative path
to development that relies more heavily on state
intervention. At the other end of the spectrum,
alarmists portray the BRICS as a real menace to
the existing order – a coalition bent on emptying
the established regimes in favour of questionable
practices and norms, including – within
international development – the provision of
‘rogue aid’ (Naím 2007).
Instead, here the BRICS grouping is treated as a
loose coalition embedded within networks of
organisations of varying degrees of
institutionalisation. In other words, in addition
to being active members of the United Nations
and the Bretton Woods Institutions, those five
states participate concurrently in less formal
platforms such as the G20, the India Brazil
South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the
BRICS. The BRICS grouping is also a dynamic
entity: within its short history, it has changed in
both composition (with the entry of South Africa)
and agenda. This dynamism contrasts with the
inflexibility of established organisations and
confers certain advantages to its members,
because it allows them to engage in topic-specific
dialogues and to cement ties informally –
including by meeting at the margins of major
international events – without committing to a
rigid alliance. While the BRICS are a loose
coalition, they are not improvised, addressing
areas as disparate as collective security, financial
governance and climate change as windows of
opportunity emerge.
In addition to this flexibility, the grouping serves
two key purposes for its members. First,
coordinated positions within the grouping can be
transposed to other multilateral settings,
whether other loose coalitions or formal
institutions. The 2013 eThekwini Declaration, for
instance, states that the five members will join
forces in implementing the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Governance and Quota
Reform: ‘We urge all members to take all
necessary steps to achieve an agreement on the
quota formula and complete the next general
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quota review by January 2014’ (BRICS 2013).
Second, the BRICS can serve as a platform for
concrete initiatives, especially in areas considered
to be the ‘paths of least resistance’ – topics in
which the member states are likeliest to find
common ground, maximising their chances of
coordinated action. Where there are clear
division lines – such as Security Council reform,
where the BRICS are split between two P52
countries (Russia and China) and three members
that aspire to hold permanent seats – such
coordination remains a mid- to long-term project.
2.2 The BRICS Development Bank project
Among the perceived ‘paths of least resistance’,
development financing is an area where the
BRICS can realistically deepen cooperation: all
five states want to expand South–South ties,
both among themselves and with other
developing countries. In addition, the BRICS
states have backed this discourse with concrete
resources, having substantially increased intra-
BRICS trade and investment over the past five
years.3 More broadly, all five wish to reduce the
dominance of the US dollar as the anchor
currency for the global economy, although its
exact replacement is not yet clear.
These common interests became evident by the
fourth BRICS Summit, held in Durban in 2013,
as the five heads of state agreed on a new
development bank, a contingency reserve
arrangement, a business council and a thinktank
council. According to the eThekwini Declaration,
the five countries’ Ministers of Finance had been
tasked in March 2012 with ‘examin[ing] the
feasibility and viability of setting up a New
Development Bank […] to supplement the
existing efforts of multilateral and regional
financial institutions for global growth and
development’ (BRICS 2013). Since then, the
initiative has moved forward through a BRICS
meeting held on the sidelines of the G20 meeting
in Saint Petersburg, Russia and meetings of
sherpas and ministerial representatives.
The bank, which is still being designed, is meant
to address capital deficits for long-term financing
for infrastructure and industrial projects in
developing countries – including, as needed, the
BRICS themselves. Russia has proposed a
US$100 billion equity base, with member states
making equal initial contributions and having
equal voting rights within the bank; at the time
of writing, however, there are counterproposals
that the amount depends on the size of each
country’s economy. Loans will most likely be
offered at market rate, diminishing the influence
of political considerations on the way in which
the capital is used.4 Given the high visibility of
Africa within the BRICS agenda so far – African
development featured prominently at the
Durban Summit – the bank is also intended to
foster socioeconomic development on the
continent, although its operations will not be
exclusive to Africa.
The bank’s institutional design and operations
will depend on ongoing discussions among
member states regarding credit lines,
headquarters location, capital structure,
governance, the bank’s rating, and the criteria for
determining which projects the bank will fund.
Governance design covers not only how leadership
is chosen, but also the institution’s hiring
practices and career tracks. Given how strongly
the BRICS emphasise respect for national
sovereignty, the bank is unlikely to impose
political conditionalities on the loans it provides.
Due to the complexity of establishing the
decision-making processes, it is unclear when the
bank will become fully operational. In September
2013, at the G20 meeting in St Petersburg,
Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak
stated that ‘we must assume that the bank will
not start functioning as fast as one could imagine’
(Caulderwood 2014). ‘These discussions will be
shaped by the interests of the BRICS countries,
as well as their individual cooperation styles and
priorities. While providing a full account of all
five states’ development cooperation programmes
lies beyond the scope of this article (for a
comparative analysis, see Mawdsley (2012)), it is
worth noting some key characteristics that are
relevant to the BDB project.
Although the Soviet Union was a major provider
of development cooperation, after its 1991
collapse the Soviet programme was suddenly
abandoned, and Russia was redefined as a
recipient of aid. It was only in 2007, with the
adoption of the ‘Concept of Russia’s Participation
in International Development Assistance’, that
Moscow signalled its intention to become a net
provider of cooperation. Russia’s bilateral
development cooperation is relatively limited,
focusing on agriculture, energy, social
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programmes and disaster assistance within
former Soviet states. However, as part of its
foreign policy efforts to project Russia as a
re-emerging state, the Russian government has
worked to expand its initiatives abroad, including
through expanded debt relief and a growing focus
on Africa (Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013).
Russia has also cooperated with international
organisations in designing its cooperation
policies, for instance aligning its accounting
procedures with DAC standards and reporting its
aid volumes to the OECD in 2011 (so far, the only
BRICS to do so) (Bakalova and Spanger 2013). To
Russia, whose cooperation is fragmented and
marked by low institutionalisation, the BDB
offers an opportunity to regain its footing in
international cooperation.
To Brazil, South–South cooperation has served
both to diversify the country’s economic
partnerships and to project influence abroad,
particularly in South America and Africa. By
building up expertise niches in areas like tropical
agriculture, public health and education, Brazil
has both expanded and institutionalised its
official development cooperation, much of which
is coordinated through the Brazilian Cooperation
Agency (ABC), a division of the Ministry of
External Relations. Brazil’s largest construction
companies undertake infrastructure projects
abroad, often with financial backing from the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) (Cabral
and Weinstock 2010). Non-state actors, including
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
labour unions, also carry out cooperation, either
through or outside of official channels. To the
Brazilian government, the BDB would serve to
both project and legitimise Brazilian cooperation
within a multilateral setting while boosting
Brazil’s calls for reform of global governance – a
topic that has been particularly salient in
Brazilian foreign policy since Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva’s leftist presidency (2003–11). In addition,
the bank would also help to enhance the reach of
Brazilian cooperation at a time when the
economy has slowed down and Brazil’s
South–South development initiatives suffer from
scaled-back funding.
India’s development cooperation has been led by
non-state actors such as private firms and
community organisations, but lately the Indian
government has taken steps to increase the
state’s role. In 2012, it launched the
Development Partnership Administration (DPA)
and new financing mechanisms for development
cooperation (Raghavan 2013). The Indian
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)
programme, created in 1964, has decades of
experience in capacity-building, and the India
Development Initiative (IDI), established in
2003, has cancelled the debts of several heavily
indebted partners. Geographically, India’s
official cooperation focuses on its geographic
vicinity, where not only does it have important
economic interests, but also faces significant
security concerns and geopolitical competition.
While India has participated in OECD-led
discussions about aid and cooperation, its
government has expressed reservations about
the DAC’s use of political conditionalities. Indian
official development cooperation has expanded
over the past decade, but its own access to
foreign capital sources is limited, meaning
India’s interest in providing finance may waiver
depending on the domestic political situation
(parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2014).
During apartheid, South Africa’s development
assistance was allocated to its nominally
autonomous homelands. Since 1994, South
African cooperation abroad has expanded,
especially in Africa. South African firms,
especially in telecommunications and retail, have
driven economic cooperation, while the state’s
role has concentrated in peacekeeping, electoral
reform and post-conflict reconstruction (Vickers
2012). Despite relying on a more restricted
budget than fellow BRICS states, the South
African government has worked to formalise and
coordinate the country’s cooperation through the
creation of the South African International
Development Agency (SAIDA), later renamed
the South African Development Partnership
Agency (SAPDA). There is some concern that
South African firms operating elsewhere in
Africa will suffer with increasing competition
from other cooperation providers, including the
other BRICS (Besharati 2013). On the other
hand, the BDB would allow South Africa to
strengthen its position as a gateway to African
development.
As for China, its cooperation-related interests
both align and compete with those of fellow
BRICS. The speed of China’s expansion abroad
means that it increasingly operates in the same
countries – sometimes, the same sectors – as
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other South–South cooperation providers. For
instance, in 2013 China recently announced a
US$125 million fund, the China–Lusophone
Africa Development Fund, meant to help Chinese
companies enter Portuguese-speaking markets in
Africa (Ventures Africa 2013). The fund also
boosts competition for Brazilian oil and
construction companies operating in countries
like Angola and Mozambique. In addition, China
occasionally vies for the same projects as fellow
BRICS countries, with the capacity to outbid
them. In South Africa, Russia and China are vying
for a massive nuclear energy tender. Although
there are other dynamics of competition among
the BRICS, the size and agility of Chinese
cooperation means that the other BRICS
countries view it as a source of growing
competition. While Chinese companies are
interested in enhancing their competitiveness, as
analysed in greater detail in the next section of
this article, the government has tried to attenuate
the perception of China as an aggressive player –
for which collaborative action through the BDB
can prove extremely useful.
At any rate, inter-member competition does not
necessarily pose a significant hurdle to the
creation of the BRICS Development Bank. The
major contributors to the World Bank, after all,
also compete among themselves, as do those of
regional banks such as the Asian Development
Bank. In addition, the bank initiative serves
common political goals. By creating a
development bank from scratch, the BRICS can
pressure existing institutions for faster reform
while offering a concrete alternative to the
Bretton Woods Institutions. As one BRICS
diplomat put it, ‘If the World Bank doesn’t want
to reform in earnest, we’ll just go ahead and
create our own bank.’ Finally, the bank
legitimises the grouping by allowing member
states to prove their (frequently questioned)
capacity to launch concrete initiatives. All of the
BRICS have resisted (albeit to different degrees)
efforts by the DAC to promote principles dear to
Northern donors, and the bank potentially
represents a platform through which to establish
a new normative framework.
2.3 China and the BRICS
For China, the BRICS grouping offers a series of
benefits and potential opportunities, many of
which overlap with those of the other member
states. First, this trans-regional initiative allows
China to boost its multilateralism, participating
in a wider variety of debates of global reach.
Second, the BRICS provides China with the
chance to reinforce its claim that it is a
responsible, solitary global player. Third, the
BRICS allows China to strengthen its dual
identity as both a developing country dedicated
to South–South cooperation, and a rising power
striving for governance reform. Finally, because
intra-BRICS relations have deepened, the
grouping is a way for China to increase trade and
investment ties to other regional powers and to
become a more influential player in global
debates about how international development
ought to be tackled.
Although, as a permanent seat holder at the UN
Security Council (UNSC), China – like Russia –
has behaved more conservatively than the
remaining BRICS where matters of security
architecture reform are concerned, in other
areas of global governance China has long called
for greater inclusiveness, often claiming to
advocate on behalf of other developing countries.
Through the BRICS, China can reinforce these
calls for change without coming across as overly
aggressive. The balance that China tries to strike
between change and status quo maintenance on
issues of development is reflected in a 2012
speech by Hu Jintao:
In their co-operation, BRICS countries have
committed to promoting South–South
cooperation and North–South dialogue,
endeavouring to implement the United
Nations Millennium Development Goals,
working for early realisation of the goals set
out in the mandate for the Doha development
round negotiations, striving to secure a
greater say for developing countries in global
economic governance, and fighting all forms
of protectionism (Radebe 2012).
From a geopolitical point of view, the BRICS
helps China to counter US hegemony without
direct confrontation. In addition, the grouping
allows China to learn more about, and deepen
ties with other rising powers – a particularly
important goal given the global reach of Chinese
interests. The desire to strengthen alignments
and relations with such states helps to explain
China’s concerted efforts to bring South Africa
into the grouping – a move reflective of China’s
strong interests in Africa and its view of South
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Africa as a gateway to the rest of the continent
(He 2011). By boosting the BRICS, China has
also been able to deflate the IBSA, a
South–South initiative that, because it is
premised on the common identity of its three
members as diverse, democratic rising powers,
excludes the possibility of Chinese membership.
To help consolidate the BRICS, China has
remained active at summits, ministerial
reunions, and sherpa meetings. The importance
attached by China to the BRICS within its
multilateral strategy is reflected in the 2012
work report of the 18th Chinese Communist
Party congress, which set guidelines for China’s
grand strategy in the coming years. Within the
document, only the UN, the G20, the BRICS and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
are mentioned among China’s institutional
priorities (Zhao 2013). China has also shown
some initiative in proposing ways to increase the
grouping’s degree of institutionalisation. For
instance, one of China’s top diplomats has
recently suggested the creation of a common
BRICS secretariat (Wright 2013). At the same
time, in order to reap the benefits of its
membership in the grouping, China has so far
consciously adopted a strategy of relative
discretion within the BRICS, avoiding a stance
that could be interpreted as domineering.
China’s discreet behaviour within the BRICS,
however, does not mean that it will refrain from
influencing the bank’s design. Like the other
BRICS states, China has appointed a task force
led by a senior official with substantial experience
to lead its work on the BDB: Chen Yuan, who in
April 2013 stepped down as Chairman of the
China Development Bank (CDB). Under Yuan,
the CDB reduced its non-performing loan ratio
and depoliticised the CDB’s lending process by
creating a system that increases autonomy
between credit risk assessments and loan approval
(Provaggi 2013). The government’s appointment
of Yuan to lead its BDB task force reflects the
level of importance attached to the initiative.
3 Chinese development and its institutions
What kinds of ideas is China likely to bring to
the BDB? In this section, I provide an overview of
how China’s development model has changed
across time, as well as how its experiences at home
are linked with its initiatives in international
cooperation.
3.1 Chinese development: a shifting model
In the 1950s, despite the generally inward policy
orientation of Mao Zedong, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) began providing
development cooperation: it transferred goods to
Pyongyang after the Korean War and offered
development finance to socialist countries along
its border. Shortly afterwards, at the initiative of
Premier Zhou Enlai, China also began assisting
liberation movements in Africa, increasing this
cooperation as African colonies became
independent states. In the 1960s, Zhou led
efforts to lay out the basic principles of the
Chinese development cooperation. In 1964, he
introduced the ‘Eight Principles of Economic and
Technical Assistance’, which included mutual
benefit, respect for national sovereignty, and
helping partner countries to become more self-
sufficient. By 1973, China was providing
development assistance to 30 nations in Africa
alone (Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher
and Ramachandran 2013) – a diversification that
helped the PRC to replace Taiwan in the United
Nations, obtaining a permanent seat at the
Security Council. However, with the notable
exception of the TAZARA railway, built in the
1970s to link the Tanzanian port of Dar es
Salaam to Zambia’s Central Province, China’s
initiatives during this period were mostly
scattered or small-scale.
Under Deng Xiaoping, economic liberalisation
began in the countryside and then accelerated
with the establishment of special economic zones
(SEZs) designed to gradually foment investment
and technology transfer. Investment in large-
scale infrastructure, including dams, roads and
railways, ports, industrial complexes and urban
equipment, helped to fuel the growth of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), but later the
government also sought to expand the private
sector (Naughton 2007). These policies yielded
high and sustained economic growth – China
attained double-digit GDP growth rates for over
15 years – and they strengthened the PRC’s
poverty alleviation capacity, lifting an estimated
600 million citizens out of poverty (Gallagher
2013). Political liberalisation, in contrast, was
put on hold after the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown in Beijing. Since then, China’s rapid
growth has brought about new challenges,
including deep cultural shifts, serious
environmental degradation and new forms of
social inequality, including a large ‘floating’
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migrant population alongside emerging pockets
of prosperity in urban areas.
China’s rapid transformation also caused
significant shifts in China’s role in international
development cooperation. According to Chin
(2012: 584), China went from being a net donor
and receiving virtually no official development
assistance (ODA) from the DAC countries to
being the world’s largest ODA recipient just a
few years later. In 1999 China graduated to the
International Development Association (IDA),
then reverted to zero net ODA as net loan
repayments offset ongoing grant transfers before
attaining net donor status.
Against this dynamic backdrop, China’s
experience with development financing begins
with the state institutions created to foment
domestic investment, including key policy banks
like the CDB and the China EximBank (CEB).
The CDB, created through the 1994 Policy Banks
Law to provide loans for major infrastructure
projects, became responsible for much of the
financing for several mega-projects, including
the Three Gorges Dam and Shanghai Pudong
International Airport, China’s busiest
international hub. The CDB, which describes
itself as ‘the engine that powers the national
government’s economic development policies’
(China Development Bank n.d.), maintains deep
ties to the state, as reflected in the bank’s
governance structure: it is led by a cabinet
minister level governor, under the direct
jurisdiction of China’s State Council. The
ensuing projects have fomented considerable
prosperity in China, but they have also entailed
major population dislocation, environmental
degradation, and in many cases, social protests.
China’s development financing institutions have
changed across time as China’s development
model was modified and as Chinese interests
abroad expanded. The country’s fast-paced
economic growth demanded raw inputs for its
manufacturing sector and for the changing
lifestyle of its swelling, increasingly urbanised
middle classes. The Chinese government played
an active role in opening doors abroad, backing
the internationalisation of Chinese companies –
especially SOEs – and fomenting international
trade and investment (immediately after the
Tiananmen crackdown, it also sought to overcome
the relative isolation in which China found itself
internationally). Through high-level visits and
other exchanges, as well as the expansion of
China’s diplomatic representations abroad, the
government deepened ties with other developing
countries, prioritising providers of minerals,
timber and other commodities. China’s energy
security policy, which has sought to diversify
sources beyond the Gulf suppliers, has also
provided impetus for expanded South–South ties.
These efforts have been accompanied by a
discourse stressing horizontality, mutual benefit
and lack of conditionalities (save for the
requirement that partners refuse to recognise
Taiwan, in keeping with Beijing’s One China
policy). The State Council’s 2013 White Paper
China–Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation reaffirms
Zhou Enlai’s Eight Principles (Office of the State
Council 2013). China has also leveraged its
identity as a developing country, framing its
cooperation as unburdened by the colonial legacy
of Northern aid. Finally, to counter perceptions of
China as a threat, the Chinese government
stressed the idea of a ‘peaceful rise’, later changed
to ‘peaceful development’, according to which
China’s fundamental interests are international
peace and prosperity, both essential to its
paramount goal of socioeconomic development.
This discourse is coupled with a soft power
strategy anchored in diplomatic, cultural and
education exchanges, as well as strategic grants
and soft-loans, meant to mitigate frictions. As part
of this effort, in 2012 the Chinese government
urged Chinese civil society entities to forge closer
ties to their African counterparts (Meng and Sun
2013). However, beyond thinktank meetings the
scope and substance of these initiatives are unclear
and Chinese cooperation remains heavily state and
company-led.
In financially backing the internationalisation of
Chinese firms, the state has relied on the same
institutions that guided its domestic investments.
Many Chinese projects abroad – often in markets
long overlooked by Northern countries – have
generated strong profits for SOEs and private
sector firms, encouraging even more Chinese
companies to go abroad. Over the past decade,
the Chinese government has continued to
emphasise the intersection of aid, trade, and
investment, while complementing market-rate
loans with concessionary loans, grants and debt
forgiveness. In Africa, China has also promoted
the creation of SEZs, thus adapting components
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of its pioneering experiments at home to other
contexts (without trying to replicate its
development model wholesale).
This intensifying cooperation has taken place
within the broader context of deep changes within
the field of international development as
South–South cooperation providers gained
influence relative to OECD donors. While, like
China, most of the developing countries have been
offering cooperation for decades, after the
millennium, in part due to the commodities boom,
they gained the economic leverage to significantly
expand their cooperation initiatives. This
diversification of actors within international
development accelerated after the 2008 onset of
the global economic crisis, when many advanced
countries scaled back their aid programmes. In
contrast, some rising powers proved resilient to the
initial shock of the crisis and were able to deepen
their South–South ties, including in countries
where Northern aid shrank (OECD 2012). Within
this shifting landscape, China has played a highly
visible role due to the size and visibility of its
cooperation, the pace of its expansion, its
unwillingness to adhere to the DAC’s norm-setting
efforts, and its reluctance, when compared to other
South–South providers, to engage in trilateral
cooperation with Northern donors.
Key Chinese banks have also gained visibility for
helping to finance much of this expansion. In
1995, aid reform allowed those institutions to
develop a variety of credit lines and grants, as
well as a resource-credit swap model in which
loans are repaid in local products and primary
goods. Just as they financed major infrastructure
and industrial policy projects in China, abroad
these mechanisms are used for the same kinds of
initiatives. Compared with other providers of
development financing, Chinese banks and
companies actively sought out sectors with
promising rather than proven growth potential,
showing greater willingness to accept risks than
their Western counterparts (Provaggi 2013).
Rather than being organised under a single
coordinating agency, those institutions are part
of a wide array of ministries, divisions and
agencies involved in different (and sometimes
overlapping) aspects of cooperation. The State
Council sets government policy for cooperation,
determines the annual development assistance
budget and reviews large grants (Brautigam
2009). The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
is in charge of most overseas grants and interest-
free loans, while CEB and CDB provide
concessional and non-concessional loans and
export credits. The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
carries out debt relief and channels contributions
to multilateral institutions. Finally, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) reviews project
requests from partner countries and coordinates
related diplomatic efforts. The complexity of this
arrangement, the differences in categorical
definitions, and the scarcity of official data make
it difficult to ascertain the true scope of Chinese
development cooperation. Chin (2012) estimates
that China is somewhere between the first and
third provider of bilateral assistance. The
perceived opacity of Chinese cooperation has
triggered debates about China’s level of
transparency, particularly in the light of the
OECD ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda. Grimm, Rank,
McDonald and Schickerling (2011) argue that,
although the Chinese government tends to
publish less data and statistics than OECD
donors, it has been moving towards greater
transparency – as reflected in the issuing of
cooperation policy white papers.5
In January 2007, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
announced that the CBD and CEB – along with
the Agricultural Development Bank of China –
would become commercial entities. The transition
has been slow, partly because these banks played a
key role in expanding the domestic economy after
the onset of the global crisis, making the
government more hesitant to increase these
institutions’ autonomy. Nevertheless, over the
past few years CDB has expanded its cooperation
portfolio to encompass partnerships with
governments and companies from over 140
countries. It currently has 38 branches and three
offices abroad (Cairo, Moscow and Rio de Janeiro)
and has become, by some measures, the world’s
largest development bank. The CEB provides
more financing to developing countries than the
World Bank. In Africa alone, China has invested
over US$2.4 billion in infrastructure and
commercial projects, mineral resources,
machinery manufacturing, power generation and
agricultural projects. Through the Forum on
China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established
in 2000, China has doubled its pledges of
cooperation to African partners at each meeting:
from US$5 billion in 2005, to US$10 billion in
2009, to US$20 billion in 2012.
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Although China often provides highly visible
projects, including stadiums, hospitals, and
government buildings as part of its soft power
strategy, the bulk of its loans is channelled into
large-scale infrastructure such as roads, ports,
and dams. This focus evokes the Bretton Woods
Institutions’ early years, when the World Bank
and the IMF financed heavy infrastructure; and
it contrasts with Northern donors’ current
prioritisation of social programmes and meeting
statistical objectives such as the Millennium
Development Goals. In addition, whereas
Northern aid has been closely associated with
trade liberalisation and financial deregulation,
China’s cooperation is heavily influenced by the
close interlinking of state and market that has
characterised Chinese development at home,
including regulated trade and financial markets
(Mwase and Yang 2012).
China’s trade and investment relations with other
developing countries have increased dramatically,
with China mostly importing raw materials and
exporting finished goods. For commodities
exporting countries, these exchanges have
boosted local economies. In addition, Chinese
investment has become an essential source of
capital, particularly in the light of widespread
disillusionment regarding Northern aid models
and lingering bitterness at the structural
adjustment packages imposed in the 1980s and
90s (Moyo 2009). As part of a broader wave of
South–South cooperation, China has contributed
to the advent of an ‘age of choice’ in which low-
income countries that once depended heavily on
Northern aid can now choose among a variety of
options (Greenhill, Prizzon and Rogerson 2013;
Mohan and Lampert 2013).
Critics of Chinese cooperation sometimes argue
that partners are incurring an unhealthy
dependency on China, and that the exchange
patterns bear an uncanny resemblance to those
established during colonial times. Others
bemoan the impact of Chinese cooperation on
human rights, the environment and labour
conditions. Both ends of the spectrum – romantic
and doomsday visions of Chinese cooperation –
tend to overlook its variability: the dynamics and
impact of Chinese cooperation have neither been
uniform across contexts, nor constant across
time (Alden 2008). Although some large-scale
infrastructure projects have generated political
tensions and social unrest, at other times
Chinese companies have adapted or pulled out of
projects altogether, either by choice or due to
local resistance. The China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest oil
company, revised an oil project in the eastern
jungle of Peru after its plans raised
environmental and social controversies (Matisoff
2012). Although far from universal, the case
reflects a degree of institutional learning by
Chinese cooperation entities, as well as the
institutions and societies with which they
interact. Although the Chinese government may
not always have the capacity or political
willpower to curb excesses committed by Chinese
companies (even those backed by state efforts), it
seems keenly aware that funding major
infrastructure and industrialisation projects
abroad brings the risk of triggering social
discontent and political backlash.
3.2 Moving beyond bilateralism
Although China has carried out its development
cooperation primarily through bilateral
channels, over the past decade China has also
contributed to multilateral efforts, seeking to
become a more active and legitimate
multilateral participant as part of a shift towards
a more flexible, varied diplomacy. Pessimists
view China’s multilateralism as a mere façade,
whereas optimists see it as reflecting China’s
commitment to international organisations and
peaceful development – arguing that, the more
China is incorporated into pre-existing
institutions, the easier it will be to ‘socialise’
Chinese political elites into Northern norms of
cooperation (Guogang and Landsdowne 2008).
Whereas China exhibited a purposeful yet
tentative experimentation with multilateralism
in the 1970s and 80s – captured by the Chinese
phrase ‘crossing the river by feeling for stones’6 –
more recently Chinese political elites made
significant strides towards enhancing China’s
multilateralism. At any rate, the idea that China
can be ‘socialised’ into existing norms
presupposes a one-way process and
underestimates the extent to which China itself
influences the multilateral forums in which it
participates (Woods 2008).
Although China joined the United Nations in
1971, for the next few decades China remained a
largely passive player; for instance, it rarely
exercised its veto power within the UNSC. After
the start of economic reforms, China has become
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a more visible actor in institutions and regimes,
in sectors as varied as financial governance,
development and security. By 2007, China
expanded its membership from a single
intergovernmental organisation (IGO) and 58
NGOs to 49 IGOs and 1,568 NGOs. In addition,
it joined a variety of forums and ad hoc
negotiations in areas including arms control and
climate change (Kent 2007). China’s 2011
accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was a major turning point in its
multilateralism: China was inducted only after
the government proved willing to impose
significant changes to the Chinese economy,
including industrial policies and tariff
reductions. Although, as a P5 country, China is
hesitant to reform certain aspects of the global
governance system, China’s highly variable
behaviour within multilateral institutions is not
easily captured by dichotomies between ‘status
quo’ and ‘revisionist’ (Wuthnow, Li and Qi 2012).
China has drawn on a variety of strategies to
boost its multilateral diplomacy. First, it has
increased its contributions towards, and its
activism within, UN agencies and other
established organisations. In some instances,
these contributions have translated into
enhanced influence within organisations. For
instance, in April 2010, the World Bank agreed
to expand China’s voting power above those of
several Western powers, including Germany,
France and Britain, elevating China to behind
only the USA and Japan in the 186-nation
lending organisation. In terms of voting power,
China’s stake in the World Bank increased from
2.78 per cent to 4.42 per cent (the USA has 15.85
per cent, and Japan has 6.84 per cent) (RTHK
2010). Second, more Chinese citizens began
occupying senior positions in major institutions,
including the United Nations, the World Health
Organization, the WTO and the World Bank.
Taiwan-born Justin Yifu Lin, who defected to
mainland China and became an economics
professor at Peking University, served as chief
economist and senior vice president of the World
Bank from June 2008 to June 2012.
In addition, China has begun spearheading or
co-launching new multilateral initiatives. Over
the past decade, it has helped to consolidate the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
originally started in 1996. The SCO originally
focused on its member states’ security concerns
in Central Asia, but China has assumed a
leadership position in deepening and broadening
the SCO’s mandate towards economic and
development cooperation initiatives (Jia 2007).
China was also instrumental in the creation of
the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), an NGO
modelled on the World Economic Forum and
designed to bring together business, government
and academic leaders for strategic discussions.
Aside from these regional initiatives, China has
been an active participant and/or founding
member of coalitions such as the G20 and (as
examined in greater detail in Section 3.3) the
BRICS. Through these platforms, Chinese
diplomats now regularly meet with their
counterparts on the sidelines of major
international meetings, including those of the
UN General Assembly and the IMF. China has
been hosting more high-level meetings, such as
the 2011 BRICS Summit, held in Sanya. Through
this burgeoning multilateralism – the result of
incremental changes rather than a conscious
policy – China has honed its diplomatic skills,
acquiring the knowledge and negotiation styles
needed to manage multilateral cooperation. From
a mere follower of rules, in many areas China has
begun to play a proactive role in the setting of
global agendas and in multilateral institution-
building (Shen 2008). Through these strategies,
China works to legitimise itself as a global player,
including – as the next section shows – in the
field of international development.
3.3 China’s role in multilateral development banks
China’s participation in the BDB project would be
far from its first engagement with a multilateral
development financing institution. China joined
the World Bank in 1980 (Bretton Woods Project
2011), although for a decade it remained a minor
player, borrowing from the bank’s low-income
country branch. Nowadays, China is classified by
the World Bank as a middle-income country, and
the Chinese government essentially uses the
institution’s loans only for small-scale projects.
However, China has begun participating in the
bank’s policy debates; in 2012, for instance, the
Development Research Centre (DRC) of the PRC
State Council teamed up with the World Bank to
produce a 468-page report, titled ‘China 2030’,
that establishes a wide range of policy measures to
prevent China from falling into the ‘middle-
income trap’ (The Economist 2012). In 2013,
Premier Li Keqiang stated that China was willing
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to collaborate more closely with the World Bank,
and he called upon the institution to ‘play a bigger
role in assisting developing countries and in
poverty reduction’ (Xinhua 2013).
China has also joined a variety of regional
development banks. In Asia, it has been a part of
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) since 1986
and currently holds the third largest proportion
of shares (after the USA and Japan). China’s
geopolitical interests have occasionally shaped
ADB initiatives. In 2009, after the bank
announced US$2.9 billion for projects in India,
China’s MOFA strongly condemned the move,
voicing concern over a US$60 million watershed
protection project in the Arunachal Pradesh
region, where part of the China–India territorial
dispute is located (SINA 2009). Although in
2010, when Premier Wen Jiabao visited India, the
two sides signed an agreement on India–China
Border Affairs, recurring territorial tensions led
the Indian government to announce in 2013,
unilateral plans to develop the region without
loans from the ADB (Wu 2013; African
Development Bank n.d.). The case illustrates
some of the conflicts of interest that may emerge
within a BDB, particularly where geopolitical
rivals China and India are concerned.
Over the past decade, as its interests have
expanded beyond Asia, China has significantly
stepped up its activism within multilateral
development initiatives beyond Asia. In the mid-
1980s, China joined the African Development
Bank (AfDB) and the African Development Fund
(ADF). Since then, China has signed agreements
in areas including environment, agriculture,
water and health, and both CEB and the CDB
signed new Memoranda of Understanding with
the AfDB. China’s contribution to the AfDB alone
has increased from an initial US$14.59 million to
a total of US$486 million. More recently, China
has been discussing a new co-financing mechanism
to fund infrastructure and private sector
initiatives in Africa (African Development Bank
n.d.). Given the BDB’s probable initial focus on
Africa, these precedents mean that Chinese bank
officials have acquired considerable knowledge
and experience interfacing with the region’s
major development institutions, as well as
individual state governments.
China’s engagement with development financing
abroad has also generated some innovations that
may prove relevant to the BDB. China is a
member of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), contributing US$250 million to
various programmes since 2009. In 2013 the
People’s Bank of China (PBC) announced it
would provide $2 billion to a Co-financing Fund
for projects related to poverty alleviation,
inequality reduction, private sector investment,
social welfare, climate change and gender
equality (IADB 2013). This type of joint
financing, reaching far beyond China’s typical
investments in heavy infrastructure, may be a
way to channel Chinese capital to sectors
prioritised by regional institutions, provided that
the BDB has mechanisms for such arrangements
in the future.
As for the normative aspect of development
multilateralism, China’s engagement with the
OECD and particularly the DAC has been
marked by a pronounced ambivalence. Like the
other BRICS, China is not a member of the
OECD and has largely rejected the DAC’s
attempt to codify the norms and practices of
international aid. In 2011, for the first time,
Chinese representatives (along with those from
Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa)
attended the DAC senior-level meeting of
directors-general (Eyben 2012). During the
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,
held in Busan, South Korea, negotiators from the
DAC member states argued that countries like
China, Brazil and India should make
commitments to making their cooperation more
measurable, transparent and efficient. DAC
donors made persistent efforts to engage with
China and refined the final document
specifically in order to persuade China to sign,
adding the option of voluntary standards for non-
DAC members (Barder 2011; Mawdsley, Savage
and Kim 2012). Several non-DAC members
ended up agreeing to voluntary standards while
insisting that South–South cooperation should
not be subject to the same expectations as
Western aid (Strange et al. 2013). Overall, the
BRICS countries did not adopt a coordinated
approach: while Brazil was content to sign the
document, India proved reluctant, and Russian
representatives distanced themselves from both
China and Brazil (Eyben and Savage 2012).
Other than the China–DAC Study Group, which
brings together Chinese and foreign cooperation
and aid experts for discussions on development
issues, China has little interface with the DAC.
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China’s resistance to DAC-led efforts, shared to
some degree by the other BRICS, seems to carry
over into its role in post-2015 development goals.
Within these discussions, China has stressed the
importance of poverty alleviation and the need to
address development in Africa, and it has
insisted that the new agenda must accommodate
different models of development – in essence,
suggesting it will resist the formulation of rigid
normative frameworks. As China’s role in the
post-2015 debates shifts from a mostly reactive
stance to a more proactive position (Wheeler
2013), these viewpoints will no doubt influence
the practices and normative stances established
by the BDB. While China’s stress on poverty
alleviation will ensure that the objective features
prominently among the bank’s overarching goals,
the institution is unlikely to adopt norms
regarding transparency, impact evaluation and
efficacy as defined by the DAC. Insofar as the
bank constitutes a concrete application of the
BRICS’ positions on development, including
China’s steadfast positions, the institution is
bound to feature prominently in global debates
about development norms. Accordingly,
contestation of the BDB, already voiced by a
number of scholars and civil society entities (see
Yu 2013; Dossani 2014), is likely to sharpen.
4 Conclusion
Although China does not need the BDB as a way
of boosting its cooperation portfolio (massive by
any measure) its participation in the initiative
generates a series of benefits for China, most of
them political. In the light of the Chinese
government’s drive to boost its multilateral
diplomacy and to project the image of a
responsible, peace-loving country, the bank
initiative offers an opportunity for China to engage
with other rising powers on a concrete initiative
of high visibility. Although China already
cooperates with development finance institutions
around the world, the bank will mark the first
time that China becomes a founding member of
an organisation dedicated exclusively to boosting
South–South development cooperation.
At the same time, the size of China’s economy
and its global projection have prompted anxiety
about China dominating the BRICS.
Economically, after all, the grouping is not one of
equal parties; the volume of trade and financial
transactions between each country and China far
exceeds any other bilateral cooperation tie
within the grouping (Russkyi Mir Foundation
2013). Moreover, China’s cooperation with other
developing countries outpaces that of any of the
other BRICS. This asymmetry has led some
critics to argue that the BRICS is nothing more
than a platform for China’s rise. This view tends
to underestimate the extent to which Chinese
policy elites endeavour to transform China into a
legitimate multilateral player aligned with other
rising powers. Becoming hegemonic within the
grouping would in fact run counter to China’s
long-term interests.
This does not mean that, when experts sit down
to hammer out credit lines and loan conditions,
China’s interests will fade into the background.
The characteristics of Chinese development
cooperation – including its vast experience
abroad, its agility, and its claim to successful
implementation of infrastructure and
industrialisation projects – may incrementally
pressure the BDB towards certain directions. In
the long term, the degree of the tilt will depend
on how well the decision-making structures built
into the bank’s design reflect an equitable
distribution of influence (for instance, through
equal voting rights and/or, in the case of China, a
cap on contributions).
As for how China will approach the negotiating
table during the bank’s design process, a
representative from one of China’s key
development financing institutions affirms that
China’s practice of providing loans based on
projects must be maintained, even when there is
regime change: ‘A project is a project. So long as
that project is commercially viable and eventually
proves beneficial to the social wellbeing of that
country, then we will go ahead [with the loan].
This new institution has to work along the same
lines.’ Given how strongly other BRICS states’
foreign policies have emphasised the concept of
national sovereignty, this preference is unlikely
to meet with resistance even from democratic
Brazil, India and South Africa.
As for its substantive contribution to the bank
project, China’s discourse regarding poverty
alleviation must reach beyond generic
statements about the economic benefits of heavy
infrastructure. In the 1960s and 70s, when the
Bretton Woods Institutions focused on heavy
infrastructure, its leaders relied on a vague
trickle-down economics to justify medium and
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large projects: the idea was that building a
dam/road/port would increase output, generate
jobs and foster growth that would benefit the
population more broadly. The impact of such
projects, including on local and regional patterns
of poverty, turned out to be more complicated,
with population displacement and social tensions
emerging alongside pockets of prosperity. The
same has been true of many projects financed by
the individual BRICS. Within the BDB, China
must therefore join forces with fellow member
states to find innovative ways to link
infrastructure and industrialisation with poverty
alleviation. Otherwise, the bank runs the risk of
throwing back cooperation to the era when
economic growth was used as a narrow proxy for
development – an outlook that would do
tremendous disservice to low-income countries.
China’s impact on the BDB may be felt just as
much by what is kept off the table as what is
maintained on the bank’s agenda: concern for
human and labour rights, environmental
conditions, and other dimensions of social
wellbeing. Another missing element will be civil
society entities. Although NGOs, professional
organisations and diaspora community
institutions have become key participants in
some of the BRICS states’ individual cooperation
programmes, especially those of Brazil and India,
it is unlikely that the BDB will grant them space
for participation or contestation, in part due to
Chinese (and Russian) fears of political
contestation. Finally, from the perspective of the
bank’s potential loan recipients, the bank will
probably bring a mixed bag of benefits and risks.
BDB loans will further broaden the range of
financing options available to low-income
countries, contributing to the so-called ‘age of
choice’, but it may also end up subjecting them
to new norms and practices altogether. The
Busan meeting showed quite clearly that – far
from China being passively ‘socialised’ into DAC
norms, global debates and practices are
themselves also influenced by China’s rejection
of Western normative frameworks.
While the BRICS have not yet offered a coherent
set of development cooperation norms, the bank
project may present those five countries with an
occasion to find common ground, precisely at a
time when the post-2015 development
discussions is reshaping the global development
agenda. China should apply its experiences with
development – both at home and through the
lessons learned financing projects abroad – to
the BDB without losing sight of overarching
goals such as poverty alleviation and contributing
to the wellbeing of populations in low-income
countries.
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* Institute of International Relations of the
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de
Janeiro, PUC-Rio/BRICS Policy Center.
1 The author wishes to thank the Fundação de
Amparo à Pesquisa no Estado do Rio de
Janeiro (FAPERJ), the Jovem Cientista
programme, CAPES and DFID for supporting
this research. 
2 P5 refers to the five members of the UN
Security Council: China, France, Russia, the
UK and the USA.
3 Russia does not adopt the language of
‘developing country’, although neither does it
see itself as a Northern donor. In addition,
Russia is not part of the OECD.
4 The grouping has also agreed upon a reserve
pooling arrangement, with US$100 billion set
aside to counter crises, as well as the impact
of withdrawal of stimulus by the US Federal
Reserve.
5 Key documents include: China’s African Policy
(January 2006), China–Africa Economic and Trade
Cooperation (December 2010), China’s Foreign
Aid (April 2011) and China–Africa Economic and
Trade Cooperation (August 2013).
6 Pinyin: Mozhe shitou guohe.
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